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 ssume that senior government ministers meeting to discuss economic 
policies at the capital in a major industrial State are interrupted by an assis-
tant who reports that large-scale malware programs have infected the criti-
cal infrastructure of the State and its private sector. In the security sector, 
large-scale routers throughout the network are failing, and classified sys-
tems have been penetrated. As the ministerial meeting suddenly shifts its 
attention to the fast-spreading cyber intrusion, the malware continues to 
spread, causing Internet-based systems to fail throughout the country. 
Government and financial institutions continue to be besieged by a distrib-
uted denial-of-service attack from tens of thousands of computers orga-
nized into botnets, a slang term for the tool that enslaves the computers of 
unknowing victims. Banks are forced to shut down, incoming payments 
due from abroad cannot arrive and government ministries close up shop. 
Credit card companies shut down their networks worldwide, fearing the 
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spread of the attacks. Meanwhile, the national government closes all its 
electronic borders. There was as yet no physical damage and no deaths or 
injuries attributable to the cyber attacks, but the economic and social costs 
are high and mounting.  
As the government’s security, intelligence and law enforcement re-
sources scramble to identify the source of the attacks and implement de-
fensive measures, legal advisers face their own challenges. The first intelli-
gence reports show the sources of the attack coming from computers all 
over the world, but with no clear indications of any State sponsorship or 
involvement. Meanwhile, terrorist groups opposed to certain of the victim-
State government’s policies have threatened attacks, but as yet the attacks 
cannot be clearly attributed. What body of law applies in responding to the 
attacks? Is the nation at war? If so, who is the enemy? Has there been a 
“use of force” or “armed attack” sufficient to trigger self-defense preroga-
tives under the UN Charter? Do the attacks create an “armed conflict” be-
tween the State and the unidentified enemy and, if so, do the laws of armed 
conflict (LOAC) apply? What is the source of the legal authority to re-
spond defensively if the perpetrators are non-State terrorists? If the com-
puters responsible for spreading the malware can be identified, but at this 
time not the State or non-State group perpetrating the attacks, what is the 
nature and scope of the authority to respond?   
The prospect of cyber war has evolved from science fiction and over-
the-top doomsday depictions on television, films and in novels to reality 
and front-page news. The revelations that the Stuxnet attack on the com-
puters that run Iran’s nuclear enrichment program was part of a larger 
“Olympic Games” campaign of cyber war begun in 2006 during the 
George W. Bush administration by the United States, and perhaps Israel, 
opened our eyes to the practical reality that the United States is engaged in 
some kind of cyber war against Iran. The United States’ use of cyber weap-
ons to attack a State’s infrastructure became the first known use of com-
puter code to effect physical destruction of equipment—in this case Irani-
an centrifuges—instead of disabling computers or stealing data.1 If the 
United States can so target Iran’s nuclear program, why not go after the 
North Koreans? Or the Assad regime in Syria, the Chinese military, or al 
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Qaeda’s global operations? If the United States can achieve important na-
tional security and foreign policy objectives through the use of cyber 
weapons, can there be any doubt that the United States is now the target of 
the same kinds of weapons?  
Most computer attacks temporarily disable the computer or its applica-
tions, or exploit the computer by reporting back data to a remote host. 
More sophisticated intrusions, however, can cause more significant disrup-
tions or even destruction, like the Iranian centrifuges or worse. Because our 
societies now entrust so much of our critical infrastructure to online sys-
tems, experts such as former Clinton and Bush administration cyber and 
counterterrorism adviser Richard A. Clarke warn that cyber attackers could 
derail trains, cause power blackouts, cause oil or gas pipelines to explode, 
or ground aircraft.2      
Whether large or small, cyber attacks are proliferating, at least in part 
because the means are becoming cheaper and easier to acquire and use.3 
Particularly when targeted at powerful adversaries like the United States, 
cyber intrusions offer a model application of asymmetric warfare, where 
adversaries much weaker in conventional terms exploit vulnerabilities in 
the stronger foe. The asymmetric attackers are further advantaged by the 
fact that they may mask their identity and location at least temporarily and 
avoid immediate attribution and response to the attacks. As such, cyber 
attacks share core characteristics with other terrorist attack modes. As the 
means to affect cyber attacks become easier to acquire and use, terrorists 
may wage cyber war against their adversaries, either directly attacking gov-
ernment systems or going after infrastructure in the private sector. 
Relatively little has been written about the legal bases for countering 
cyber terrorism,4 and it has yet to be considered whether counterterrorism 
law could illuminate ad bellum norms for responding to cyber attacks perpe-
trated by terrorists or where the source of an attack cannot be promptly 
attributed and terrorists are suspected. The relative lack of attention given 
by States and international law experts to counterterrorism law as a source 
of authority to govern responses to cyber attacks is not surprising in view 
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of the difficulties more generally in the international community to identify 
and agree upon a legal paradigm for counterterrorism.5 Although the inter-
national community continues to struggle to find an acceptable definition 
of terrorism,6 it is generally understood that a cyber terrorist “uses Internet-
based attacks in terrorist activities, including acts of deliberate, large-scale 
disruption of computer networks.”7 Like terrorism generally, cyber terror-
ism intends “to intimidate or coerce governments or societies in pursuit of 
goals that are political, religious, or ideological. . . . Attacks that lead to 
death or bodily injury, extended power outages, plane crashes, water con-
tamination, or major economic losses would be examples.”8  
Meanwhile, the prospects for the use of cyber weapons by and against 
terrorist groups are increasing. Research conducted in the period immedi-
ately after the 9/11 attacks suggested that, although terrorists’ interest in 
cyber attacks was increasing, their capabilities then were demonstrated only 
for theft and low-level attacks.9 By implication, more disruptive or damag-
ing versions of cyber terrorism could become a significant threat in the fu-
ture. Meanwhile, at least since 2008 reports document likely Western gov-
ernment uses of cyber weapons against terrorist websites,10 and U.S. use of 
cyber intrusions aimed at cell phone communications among terrorist lead-
ers that could lure them to an ambush, spread false information that fellow 
jihadists were conspiring against their comrades and otherwise incite dis-
trust of their supposedly secure communications.11 
Even as experts recognize that terrorists may engage in cyber war, the 
international community continues to rely on a legal conception that limits 
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terrorism to “acts of violence committed in time of peace,”12 a categoriza-
tion that excludes most, though not all, cyber attacks. Despite the growing 
role of the cyber domain in the security sectors of many governments over 
the last decade, the maturing legal architecture for cyber war pays little at-
tention to cyber attacks by terrorists or to cyber attacks that do not pro-
duce harmful effects equivalent to kinetic attacks. A distinguished Interna-
tional Group of Experts was invited by NATO in 2009 to produce a man-
ual on the law governing cyber warfare.13 The resulting Tallinn Manual on the 
International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare restates the consensus view that 
prohibits “cyber attacks, or the threat thereof, the primary purpose of 
which is to spread terror among the civilian population.”14 The Tallinn 
Manual experts concluded that cyber attacks can constitute terrorism, but 
only where the attack has been conducted through “acts of violence.”15 In 
defining the scope of their project, the Tallinn Manual experts considered 
only those forms of cyber attack that meet the UN Charter and LOAC 
conceptions of “use of force” or “armed attack.”16 In other words, the Tal-
linn Manual concludes that international law proscribes only violent terror-
ism and thus leaves unregulated an entire range of very disruptive cyber 
intrusions.17 To date there has been little attention given to the possibility 
that international law generally and counterterrorism law in particular could 
and should develop a subset of cyber-counterterrorism law to respond to 
the inevitability of cyber attacks by terrorists and the use of cyber weapons 
by governments against terrorists, and to supplement existing international 
law governing cyber war where the intrusions do not meet the traditional 
kinetic thresholds.  
Developing a consensus understanding of the international law of 
cyber war is complicated by a few unique attributes of the cyber domain. 
Prompt attribution of an attack and even threat identification can be very 
difficult. As a result, setting the critical normative starting point in the UN 
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Charter and laws of armed conflict—the line between offense and de-
fense—is elusive, particularly taking into account the possibilities afforded 
by cyber “active defenses.” Is it lawful to anticipate cyber attacks by im-
plementing countermeasures in advance of the intrusion? How disruptive 
or destructive a response does the law permit once a source of the incom-
ing intrusions is identified, even plausibly? If victim States cannot reliably 
attribute incoming attacks, must they delay all but the most passive re-
sponses until the threat can be reliably identified? In addition, because 
cyber attacks will likely originate from multiple sources in many States, us-
ing geography as a proxy for a battlespace may not be realistic or useful in 
the cyber context. Even assuming attribution of incoming attacks, which, if 
any, geographic borders should define the scope of a victim State’s re-
sponses?  
Even with these limitations, there may be emerging legal clarity in some 
cyber war situations. In instances where a cyber attack causes physical de-
struction and/or casualties at a significant level, a cyber intrusion may con-
stitute an “armed attack” in UN Charter terms. In these extreme circum-
stances, even where the attacker is a State-sponsored non-State actor, there 
is emerging post–September 11 customary law permitting a forceful re-
sponse in self-defense, assuming attribution of the attacker.18 In addition, 
whether the Charter criteria have been met is most likely a function of the 
consequences of the cyber event, and is not dependent on the instrument 
used in the attack.19 Apart from this relatively small subset of cyber intru-
sions, however, the legal regime remains clouded and ambiguous. 
International law scholars and operational lawyers have struggled over 
the last decade to accommodate LOAC and the UN Charter system to 
asymmetric warfare waged by non-State actors, including terrorist groups. 
A similar effort is now under way—evidenced by the Tallinn Manual pro-
ject—to incorporate cyber war in our long-standing positive law systems 
for protecting civilians from the ravages of war. Yet the language and struc-
ture of LOAC (the regulation of “armed conflict”) and of the Charter (fo-
cusing on “use of force” and “armed attack”) present considerable analytic 
challenges and even incongruities in attempting to fit cyber into the con-
ventional framework for armed conflict. Because cyber attacks may occur 
continuously or in stages with no overt hostility and range from low-level 
harassment to potentially catastrophic harms to a State’s infrastructure, the 
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either/or dichotomies of war and peace and armed conflict/no armed con-
flict are not in most instances well suited to the cyber domain. Nor are the 
Charter threshold requirements—that there be suffered by a victim State a 
“use of force” or “armed attack” before forceful defenses are employed—
easily interpreted to accommodate cyber attacks. Over time, the ongoing 
struggle to fit cyber into the LOAC and Charter categories may threaten 
their normative integrity and their basic commitment to collective security 
and restraints on unilateral uses of force.  
Most cyber intrusions now and in the foreseeable future will take place 
outside the traditional consensus normative framework for uses of force 
supplied by international law. For the myriad, multilayered and multifaceted 
cyber attacks that disrupt but do not destroy, whether State-sponsored or 
perpetrated by organized private groups or single hacktivists, much work 
remains to be done to build a normative architecture that will set enforcea-
ble limits on cyber intrusions and provide guidelines for responses to dis-
ruptive cyber intrusions. In this article, my interest is directed at a subset of 
those cyber attacks—those where terrorists are responsible or attribution is 
not known but points in the terrorists’ direction, and where the effects are 
very disruptive but not sufficiently destructive to cross the traditional 
LOAC and Charter self-defense thresholds.  
For this subset of cyber attacks, counterterrorism law may offer a use-
ful complementary normative supplement to LOAC and the Charter. Es-
pecially over the last decade, a corpus of counterterrorism law has evolved 
as domestic and international law in response to transnational terrorism. In 
contrast to the dominant pre–September 11 conception that countering 
terrorism involved either the use of military force or enforcement of the 
criminal laws, counterterrorism law now incorporates a diverse range of 
responses to terrorism, many of which are borrowed, sometimes in modi-
fied form, from existing international and domestic law. Based on a matur-
ing international legal regime, this article concludes that over time and 
through State practice, along with legal, strategy and policy development in 
the international community, a set of counterterrorism law norms for cyber 
war could emerge. 
In this article, I will first review the ad bellum justifications for conduct-
ing cyber war within the Charter and LOAC systems. The international law 
doctrines permitting countermeasures offer one set of options, and the 
possibility that cyber intrusions could constitute an unlawful intervention, 
“use of force” or “armed attack” will also be considered briefly. I conclude 












that further accommodating the various forms of cyber war could com-
promise the normative integrity of the existing system for limiting the use 
of force and may unnecessarily further militarize the cyber domain.20 Part 
III traces the sources and contents of counterterrorism law that could pro-
vide the normative bases for cyber war in some circumstances. In light of 
the analysis in Parts II and III, Part IV will speculate concerning how an 
international counterterrorism law might develop in the cyber domain. As 
has been the case with counterterrorism law generally, a cyber-oriented 
counterterrorism law will follow the eventual development and implemen-
tation of national and international policies and strategies to counter cyber 
threats. 
  
II. FINDING AD BELLUM JUSTIFICATION FOR CYBER WAR 
 
Assume that the fictional State of Evil launches a massive malware attack at 
the fictional State of Bliss. The botnets and sophisticated software un-
leashed by the malware cause power failures when generators are shut 
down by the malware. Train derailments and airplane crashes with hun-
dreds of casualties soon follow as traffic control and communications sys-
tems that rely on the Internet are made to issue false signals to pilots and 
conductors. Dozens of motorists die when traffic lights and signals mal-
function at the height of an urban rush hour. Evil acknowledges its respon-
sibility for the cyber attacks, and it says that more are on the way. Clearly 
there is an international armed conflict (IAC) between Evil and Bliss and, 
pending Security Council action, Bliss is lawfully permitted by Article 51 of 
the Charter to use self-defense to respond to the “armed attack” by Evil. 
The Charter and LOAC norms provide sufficient ad bellum authority for 
Bliss to respond to these cyber attacks.  
Assume instead that a terrorist group has launched a series of cyber at-
tacks on the banking system of a G-8 State. The malware is sophisticated; 
large and small customers’ accounts are targeted and account balances are 
reduced by hundreds of millions of dollars. For the time being the attacks 
cannot be attributed to the terrorist group, but terrorists are suspected in 
light of intelligence reports. No one has been injured or killed. There is no 
IAC, either because there is no known State adversary either because there 
has been no “attack” as contemplated by Article 49 of the Third Geneva 
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Convention. There is no non-international armed conflict (NIAC), because 
the conflict is not sufficiently intense, or because the likely culprit is not an 
organized armed group. It is far from clear that there has been a “use of 
force” as contemplated by Article 2(4) of the Charter, or an “armed attack” 
within the meaning of Article 51. Surely the G-8 State must respond to de-
flect and/or dismantle the sources of the malware, and delaying responses 
until attribution is certain will greatly exacerbate the crisis. Under these cir-
cumstances, what ad bellum principles should determine the victim State’s 
response?   
Although these two simplistic scenarios do not fairly represent the wide 
range of possible cyber intrusions that occur now on a daily basis, they do 
underscore that only the most destructive cyber attacks fall clearly within 
the existing Charter and LOAC framework for cyber war. Why is fitting 
cyber within the traditional framework for armed conflict so difficult? 
What international law principles offer the best options for extending their 
application to cyber attacks? 
One of the most challenging aspects of regulating cyber war is timely 
attribution. As Joel Brenner reminds us, “the Internet is one big masquer-
ade ball. You can hide behind aliases, you can hide behind proxy servers, 
and you can surreptitiously enslave other computers to do your dirty 
work.”21 Cyber attacks also often occur in stages over time. Infiltration of a 
system by computers operated by different people in different places may 
be followed by delivery of the payload and, perhaps at a later time, mani-
festation of the harmful effects. At what stage has the cyber attack oc-
curred? Attribution difficulties also reduce the disincentives to cyber attack 
and further level the playing field for cyber war waged by terrorists. Alt-
hough identifying a cyber intruder can be aided by a growing set of digital 
forensic tools, attribution is not always fast or certain, making judgments 
about who was responsible for the cyber intrusion that harmed the victim 
State probabilistic.22 Even where the most sophisticated forensics can relia-
bly determine the source of an attack, the secrecy of those methods may 
make it difficult to demonstrate attribution in a publicly convincing way. 
Because the Charter- and LOAC-based ad bellum justifications for respond-
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ing to a cyber attack are tied to attribution of the attack and thus identifica-
tion of the enemy, the legal requirements for attribution may at least delay 
effective defenses or responses.  
The traditional approach to assessing ad bellum authority to respond to 
aggression involves assessing the consequences of the attack. What interna-
tional law determines the permissible responses to a cyber attack that caus-
es considerable economic harm but no physical damage? Is the loss or de-
struction of property sufficient to trigger a kinetic response? The answer 
turns in part on whether the State wishes to use force in response. For 
non-forceful responses, customary international law has long allowed coun-
termeasures—lawful actions undertaken by an injured State in response to 
another State’s internationally unlawful conduct.23 In the cyber context, in-
trusions that fall short of armed attacks as defined by the Charter are none-
theless in violation of the international law norm of non-intervention and 
thus permit the reciprocal form of violation by the victimized State. As 
codified by the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Respon-
sibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, countermeasures must 
be targeted at the State responsible for the prior wrongful act, and must be 
temporary and instrumentally directed to induce the responsible State to 
cease its violation.24   
In the cyber arena, one important question is whether countermeasures 
include so-called active defenses, which attempt through an in-kind re-
sponse to disable the source of an attack while it is under way.25 Whatever 
active defense technique is pursued by the victim State thus has a reciprocal 
relationship with the original cyber intrusion, and like the original intrusion 
the active defense presumptively breaches State sovereignty and violates 
the international law norm of non-intervention. (Passive defenses, such as 
firewalls, attempt to repel an incoming cyber attack.) Active defenses may 
be pre-set to deploy automatically in the event of a cyber attack, or they 
may be managed manually.26 Computer programs that relay destructive vi-
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ruses to the original intruder’s computer or packet-flood the computer 
have been publicly discussed.27 Although descriptions of most active de-
fenses are classified, the United States has publicly stated that it employs 
“active cyber defense” to “detect and stop malicious activity before it can 
affect [Department of Defense] networks and systems.”28  
In theory, countermeasures provide a potentially effective defensive 
counter to cyber attacks. In practice, a few problems significantly limit their 
effectiveness. First, the Draft Articles codify customary law requirements 
that before a State may use active defense countermeasures it must find 
that an internationally wrongful act caused the State harm, identify the 
State responsible and follow various procedural requirements,29 delaying 
execution of the active defense. The delay may be exacerbated by the prob-
lems in determining attribution. Second, note that countermeasures cus-
tomarily are available in State-on-State conflicts, not in response to intru-
sions by a non-State actor. A non-State actor’s actions may be attributable 
to a State when the State knows of the non-State actors’ actions and aids 
them in some way,30 or possibly when the State merely knowingly lets its 
territory be used for unlawful acts.31 In most instances, however, interna-
tional law supplies no guidance on countermeasures that respond to intru-
sions by non-State actors. Third, the normative principle that justifies 
countermeasures is that the initial attacker must find the countermeasure 
sufficiently costly to incentivize lawful behavior. For non-State terrorist 
groups that act independent of any State, a fairly simple relocation of their 
servers or other equipment may evade or overcome the countermeasures 
and remove any incentives to stop the attacks. In sum, although the coun-
termeasures doctrine is well suited to non-kinetic responses to cyber at-
tacks by States, attribution delays may limit their availability, and the line 
between permitted countermeasures and a countermeasure that constitutes 
a forbidden “use of force” is not clear. Nor do countermeasures apply in 
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responding to a terrorist group unaffiliated with any State, and such groups 
are less likely to be incentivized by the countermeasures to stop their at-
tacks.   
Even if each of these limitations is overcome, the prevailing view is 
that active defenses may only be employed when the intrusion suffered by 
a victim State involves a “use of force” as interpreted at international law.32 
Note the potential for tautology in this legal analysis—“force” in the form 
of active defense is allowed in response because the responder labels the 
incoming intrusion a “use of force.” Taken together, the promise of coun-
termeasures in responding to cyber attacks is significantly compromised by 
problems of attribution, timing, efficacy and logic. At the same time, if ac-
tive defense countermeasures are not considered as a “use of force,” the 
attribution problem loses its urgency. There is no clear international barrier 
to non–use of force countermeasures, and attribution may be determined 
when feasible since no force is being used. Finally, the International Group 
of Experts that prepared the Tallinn Manual acknowledged that while victim 
States may not continue countermeasures after the initial intrusion had 
ended, State practice “is not fully in accord. . . . States sometimes appear 
motivated by punitive considerations . . . after the other State’s violation of 
international law has ended.”33 In other words, customary law on cyber 
countermeasures is in flux.  
After providing in Article 2(4) that all member States “shall refrain . . . 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state,”34Article 51 creates an exception to the strict 
prohibition by stating that “[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair 
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack 
occurs against a Member of the United Nations.”35 The “use of force” ru-
bric from Article 2(4) establishes the standard for determining a violation 
of international law. Once a use of force occurs, permissible responses are 
determined by the law of State responsibility,36 potential Security Council 
resolutions and the law of self-defense. The traditional and dominant view 
among member States is that the prohibition on the use of force and right 
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of self-defense apply to armed violence, such as military attacks,37 and only 
to interventions that produce physical damage. As such, most cyber attacks 
will not violate Article 2(4).38 Throughout the Cold War, some States ar-
gued that the Article 2(4) “use of force” prohibition should focus not so 
much on the instrument as the effects of an intrusion and thus forbids co-
ercion, by whatever means, or violations of sovereign boundaries, however 
carried out.39 The United States opposed these efforts to broaden the in-
terpretation of “use of force” by developing States, and by the end of the 
Cold War Charter interpretation had settled on the traditional and narrower 
focus on armed violence.40  
Article 2(4) is textually capable of evolving to include cyber intrusions, 
depending on the severity of their impact. Cyber attacks can cause harm 
equivalent to kinetic attacks. The imprecision of the text and the growing 
cyber threat suggests that State practice may now or will in the future rec-
ognize cyber intrusions as “uses of force,” at least when cyber attacks de-
liver consequences that resemble those of conventional armed attacks.41 
Public statements by the United States in recent years suggest that our gov-
ernment is moving toward this sort of effects-based interpretation of the 
Charter’s use-of-force norm in shaping its cyber defense policies, a position 
at odds with our government’s history of resisting flexible standards for 
interpreting Article 2(4).42 As historically interpreted, however, the Charter 
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purposefully imposes an additional barrier to a forceful response to a use 
of force. The response to such a use of force cannot itself rise to the level 
of use of force unless authorized by the Security Council or unless it is a 
lawful action in self-defense.43 In other words, unilateral responses to a use 
of force are permitted only if the intrusion constitutes an armed attack rec-
ognized by Article 51. 
To the extent that cyber intrusions do not meet the criteria for “use of 
force,” Russell Buchan argues that cyber attacks that do not cause physical 
damage violate international law on the basis of the principle of non-
intervention as embodied in customary law.44 Buchan maintains that non-
intervention proscribes cyber attacks that are not destructive so long as the 
attack is intended to coerce a victim State into a change in policy “in rela-
tion to a matter that the victim State is freely entitled to determine itself.”45 
Although the non-intervention norm has the potential to serve as a legal 
barrier to disruptive cyber intrusions, there is no indication that any State 
has relied on Buchan’s argument, or that any court has credited it in a cyber 
context.  
Some scholars have argued that cyber attacks that are especially de-
structive but have not traditionally been considered armed attacks under 
Article 51 might nonetheless give rise to the Article 51 right of self-
defense.46 But no international tribunal has so held. In a case involving 
conventional armed violence, but on a small scale, the United States argued 
unsuccessfully before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that its naval 
attacks on Iranian oil platforms were justified by the right of self-defense 
following low-level Iranian attacks on U.S. vessels in the Persian Gulf.47 
Although the separate opinion of Judge Simma in the Oil Platforms case ar-
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gued that self-defense should permit more forceful countermeasures where 
the “armed attack” threshold has not been met,48 this more flexible ap-
proach has not been accepted by the ICJ or any court, and only State prac-
tice is likely to change the prevailing traditional interpretation.  
In any case, the “use of force” framework has little value in developing 
responses to terrorists. By the terms of the Charter, non-State actors can-
not violate Article 2(4), and responses to uses of force are limited to ac-
tions carried out by or otherwise the responsibility of States.49 Guidance on 
the degree of State control that must exist to establish State liability for a 
non-State group’s actions was supplied by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case, 
where the Court limited U.S. responsibility for actions of the Nicaraguan 
Contras to actions where the United States exercised “effective control of 
the military or paramilitary operations [of the Contras] in the course of 
which the alleged violations were committed.”50 Only if the State admits its 
collaboration with terrorists51 or is otherwise found responsible for the ter-
rorists’ actions may the victim State use force against the terrorists and 
sponsoring State.  
In recent years, the law of self-defense has been at the center of inter-
national law attention. Yet for better or worse, the legal doctrine remains 
unsettled. The text of Article 51—“armed attack”—is not as amenable as 
“use of force” to a flexible interpretation (the phrase “armed attack” is rela-
tively precise). Nor did the Charter drafters consider the possibility that 
very harmful consequences could follow from a non-kinetic, cyber attack. 
Nonetheless, outside the cyber realm State practice has evolved toward ac-
cepting that attacks by terrorists may constitute an armed attack that trig-
gers Article 51 self-defense.52 The text of Article 51 does not limit armed 
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attacks to actions carried out by States, although the State-centric model of 
the Charter strongly suggests that the drafters contemplated only those 
armed attacks by non-State actors that could be attributed to a State as Ar-
ticle 51 armed attacks.  
The dramatic development that made it clear that armed attacks may 
occur by non-State terrorists regardless of the role of a State was 9/11. 
Within days of the attacks, the Security Council unanimously passed Reso-
lutions 1368 and 1373 and recognized “the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense in accordance with the Charter” in responding to the 
attacks.53 NATO adopted a similarly worded resolution.54 Unlike prior in-
stances where non-State attackers were closely linked to State support, the 
Taliban merely provided sanctuary to al Qaeda and did not exercise control 
and were not substantially involved in al Qaeda operations.55  
State practice in the international community supported extending self-
defense as the ad bellum justification for countering al Qaeda on a number 
of occasions since 2001.56 While the ICJ has not ratified the evolving State 
practice, and even seemed to repudiate it in at least three decisions—twice 
since 9/1157—the trend is to accept the extension of armed attack self-
                                                                                                                      
VAL LAW REVIEW 1, 7–13 (2008). Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber Operations in International Law: 
The Use of Force, Collective Security, Self-Defense, and Armed Conflicts, in PROCEEDINGS OF A 
WORKSHOP ON DETERRING CYBERATTACKS, supra note 41, 151, 163–64; Sean Watts, 
Low-Intensity Computer Network Attack and Self-Defense, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
CHANGING CHARACTER OF WAR 59, 75–76 (Raul A. “Pete” Pedrozo & Daria P. Woll-
schlaeger eds., 2011) (Vol. 87, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies); Office 
of General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense, An Assessment of International Legal 
Issues in Information Operations 16 (May 1999), available at http://www.au.af.mil/ 
au/awc/awcgate/dod-io-legal/dod-io-legal.pdf [hereinafter An Assessment of Interna-
tional Legal Issues]; see also TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 13, rule 13, cmt. 16 (majority of 
the Group of Experts agree that a cyber attack by terrorists may constitute an armed at-
tack). 
53. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).  
54. Press Release, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Statement by the North Atlan-
tic Council (Sept. 12, 2001), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-
124e.htm. 
55. See Derek Jinks, State Responsibility for the Acts of Private Armed Groups, 4 CHICAGO 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 83, 89 (2003). 
56. Ratner, supra note 52, nn.5–6.  
57. In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ never considered whether paramilitary activity by 
the contras or the FMLN was an armed attack, and focused only on whether their activi-
ties could be imputed to the States involved. In Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, 













defense authorities when non-State groups are responsible, provided the 
armed attack predicate is met and the group is organized and not a set of 
isolated individuals.58 Unsurprisingly, the U.S. Department of Defense 
supports the same position.59 Thus, despite the apparent gulf between the 
text of the Charter as interpreted by the ICJ and State practice, whether an 
“armed attack” is kinetic or cyber-based, armed force may be used in re-
sponse to an imminent attack if it reasonably appears that a failure to act 
promptly will deprive the victim State of the opportunity to defend itself.60  
The legal bases for self-defense have similarly been extended to antici-
patory self-defense in the cyber context. As evolved from Secretary of State 
Daniel Webster’s famous formulation in response to the Caroline incident 
that self-defense applies in advance of an actual attack when the “necessity 
of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving . . . no moment 
for deliberation,”61 contemporary anticipatory self-defense permits the use 
of force in anticipation of attacks that are imminent, even if the exact time 
and place of attack are not known.62 Imminence in contemporary contexts 
is measured by reference to a point in time where the State must act defen-
sively before it becomes too late.63 In addition to imminence or immediacy, 
the use of force in self-defense must be necessary—law enforcement or 
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other non–use of force means will not suffice—and the attacking group 
must be shown to have the intent and means to carry out the attack.64  
In contemporary State practice, nearly every use of force around the 
world is justified as an exercise of self-defense.65 As Sean Watts has ob-
served, “in the post-Charter world . . . States have resurrected pre-Charter 
notions that self-defense includes all means necessary for self-preservation 
against all threats.”66 In this environment of expansive interpretations of 
self-defense relatively unbounded by positive law, the legal parameters of 
self-defense law as just summarized may be applied to the cyber domain 
and adapted to cyber attacks, subject to meeting the Article 51 threshold of 
armed attack. Applied to non-State actors, if a cyber attack by a non-State 
actor constitutes an armed attack as contemplated by the Charter, self-
defense allows the victim State to conduct forceful operations in the State 
where the terrorist perpetrators are located if the latter State is unable or 
unwilling to police its territory. In the sphere of anticipatory self-defense, 
the fact that cyber attacks will come unattributed and without warning pro-
vides strong analogs to the challenges of counterterrorism law. At the same 
time, even though reliance on self-defense arguments is and will remain 
tempting in the cyber arena, the value of the Charter system in making law 
for new cyber-response applications is limited by the “use of force” and 
“armed attack” qualifications. 
What do the Charter, LOAC and emerging State practice say about 
cyber attacks that do not meet the armed attack threshold? One potentially 
important rule distilled from the Charter and State practice is that a number 
of small cyber attacks that do not individually qualify as armed attacks 
might do so when aggregated, provided there is convincing evidence that 
the same intruder is responsible for all of the attacks.67 The so-called pin-
prick theory could have emerging importance in supporting cyber self-
defense, especially if technical advances aid in attribution. Otherwise, distil-
ling the conclusions in this section, the international law of self-defense 
may only justify responses to cyber attacks that are sufficiently destructive 
to meet the armed attack threshold, a small subset of cyber intrusions. Still, 
in limited situations, if a cyber intrusion is believed to be caused by a non-
State terrorist organization (through actual attribution or meeting an immi-
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nence requirement in anticipatory self-defense), and the intrusion is suffi-
ciently disruptive as to cause significant harm to important functions in 
society but does not meet the traditional armed attack criteria, it remains 
possible that Article 51 self-defense authority may be extended to permit 
forceful countermeasures or other forceful responses to a cyber attack, 
based on State practice. Whether the development of cyber law so removed 
from the text of the Charter represents the optimal path forward for the 
law of cyber war will be considered in the final section of this article. On 
the one hand, the Charter’s self-defense doctrine as traditionally under-
stood may not leave States adequate authority to respond to the full range 
of cyber threats they face. On the other hand, the development of custom-
ary law through State practice is the ultimate flexible vehicle for making 
new law to confront emerging problems. Even Charter law interpreted at 
degrees of separation from the Charter is preferable to a legal vacuum.68 
We will see that counterterrorism law may contribute to the development 
of an international legal paradigm for cyber defense without producing ad-
ditional strain on traditional ad bellum norms. 
 
III. THE POTENTIAL FOR APPLICATION OF COUNTERTERRORISM LAW 
 
Counterterrorism law is immature, in flux and heavily contested. This sec-
tion will show that, despite resistance from many quarters and a two-steps-
forward-one-step-back development in the United States, counterterrorism 
law deserves recognition as a discrete and integral part of international law. 
As the international community gradually embraced the idea that violent 
terrorism by non-State actors justifies the use of force pursuant to the jus ad 
bellum, several treaties and agreements, Security Council resolutions, and 
State practice are beginning to recognize counterterrorism law as a sort of 
hybrid blend of several components of international law. The cyber domain 
is not yet part of the new corpus, but its time may have arrived. 
As Adam Roberts noted more than ten years ago, counterterrorism op-
erations are not entirely like or unlike armed conflicts or other wars.69 The 
fact that counterterrorism involves the use of military force along with pur-
suit of law enforcement and other non–use of force methods involves 
awkward confluences with international law generally and with ad bellum 
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and in bello principles in particular. By and large, the awkwardness has been 
explained away by international law scholars in the past in their assertions 
that there simply is no international law concerning terrorism.70 Undenia-
bly, however, there is now an evolving international counterterrorism law. 
Through thirteen international treaties, several Security Council resolutions, 
State practice and emerging policies counterterrorism is developing as an 
international law paradigm in ways similar to human rights law develop-
ment in earlier years.71 The counterterrorism methods are not new, for the 
most part, and the counterterrorism paradigm does not so much reject the 
LOAC/armed conflict/war models as offer a complement to them.  
That the field of international counterterrorism law is gaining recogni-
tion among practitioners and scholars is reflected by the publication of two 
comprehensive treatises covering counterterrorism law in recent years, each 
with a stable of distinguished jurists, lawyers and scholars as contributors, 
and both intent on surveying the state of law in a growing and complex 
field.72 Selections from their combined tables of contents are illustrative: 
counterterrorism and the rule of law framework, multidisciplinary perspec-
tives, UN counterterrorism instruments, judicial and non-judicial responses 
to terrorism, criminal laws and jurisdiction, investigations and prosecutions, 
pretrial and trial issues, combating terrorism financing, alternative remit-
tance systems, human rights in countering terrorism and international co-
operation.73 As explained by Katja Samuel in the 2012 volume of Counter-
Terrorism: International Law and Practice, the “backbone of the existing inter-
national [counterterrorism] rule of law framework” consists of human 
rights law, humanitarian law, criminal law and refugee/immigration law, 
along with the Charter and general international law principles.74 
Just as it is noteworthy that international counterterrorism law has 
emerged as a discrete field, the omission of any treatment of international 
cyber law in the treatises is striking. In the cyber realm, instead of treating 
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cyber attacks by terrorists in the either/or dichotomy as crimes or equiva-
lent to kinetic attacks, counterterrorism law may prescribe a range of re-
sponses, including intelligence collection and threat identification, border 
controls, asylum and refugee status rules and procedures, controls on 
providing financial support to terrorists and kinetic options, the contents 
of which may vary from traditional LOAC use of force, depending on the 
harm caused by the attacks. Particularly over the decade after 9/11, coun-
terterrorism matured as a legal regime composed of primary rules, includ-
ing Security Council resolutions requiring that States take steps to counter 
terrorism and various treaties, and secondary rules that monitor enforce-
ment of the counterterrorism tools and add norms to counterterrorism in 
subsidiary areas, such as international criminal law and armed conflict.75 
Unsurprisingly, the development of an international law of counterterror-
ism reflects parallel developments at the national level in many States.76  
Counterterrorism law is similarly evolving as domestic law in the Unit-
ed States. Before the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. Army defined counterterrorism 
as “offensive military operations designed to prevent, deter and respond to 
terrorism.”77 The Defense Department recognized after 9/11 that “some 
significant policy and strategy adjustments were required”78 to counterter-
rorism doctrine owing to the evolution of the terrorist threat and to con-
form U.S. military doctrine to international law (the pre-9/11 definition 
may have permitted actions in violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter). The 
National Security Strategy of the United States also gradually showed a ma-
turing understanding of the role of counterterrorism. The 2002 Strategy 
became immediately controversial because of its articulation of an apparent 
doctrine of preemption.79 By 2006, the preemption language was moved 
from the section on terrorism to a section focusing on weapons of mass 
destruction, and the Strategy recognized that the counterterrorism para-
digm involves more than criminal law enforcement and reorientation of the 
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norms for war.80 Concerning the use of force in counterterrorism, the 
measure of imminence in self-defense had evolved in domestic law as it 
had in international law due to the anonymity and surprise factors in terror-
ist attacks and was measured as much by the availability of an opportunity 
to respond as by the immediacy in time of the anticipated attack.81 Like-
wise, territorial sovereignty weakened as a barrier to action in self-defense.82 
By 2009, the Department of Defense had broadened considerably its defi-
nition of counterterrorism: “actions taken directly against terrorist net-
works and indirectly to influence and render global and regional environ-
ments inhospitable to terrorist networks.”83 So understood, counterterror-
ism “is an activity of irregular warfare” and its “efforts should include all 
instruments of national power to undermine an adversary’s power and will, 
and its credibility and legitimacy to influence the relevant population.”84 
As a baseline proposition, in the twenty-first century there can be little 
doubt that violent terrorism justifies the use of force in countering terrorist 
attacks pursuant to the jus ad bellum. Any shortcomings in the normative 
foundation for counterterrorism law were effectively erased after the 9/11 
attacks and passage of Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1377. Even 
in the years before 9/11, the Security Council recognized that terrorism 
could constitute a breach of peace and security.85 Although the Council has 
not authorized the use of force in response to terrorism, it could do so.86 
The Counterterrorism Committee of the United Nations Security Council 
was established in 2001 by Resolution 1373, which determined “to combat 
by all means threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist 
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acts”87 and commended all States to take necessary steps to prevent terror-
ism and ensure that terrorist acts are established as criminal offenses in 
domestic laws. Resolution 1373 also obliged member States to prevent the 
financing of terrorism; criminalize the collection of funds for terrorist pur-
poses; freeze the financial assets of anyone who participates in, or facili-
tates, terrorism; take any steps necessary to prevent terrorist acts, including 
passing early-warning information to other States; suppress recruitment of 
members of terrorist groups; eliminate the supply of weapons to terrorists; 
deny safe haven to those involved in terrorism; and ensure that serious 
criminal penalties are established for all terrorist acts.88  
In 2006 the General Assembly adopted the Global Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy and embraced what it called a common framework to fight terror-
ism.89 The General Assembly recognized that counterterrorism law incor-
porates a multifaceted set of tools that relies on the legal principles in 
LOAC, human rights law, refugee and asylum law, and criminal law, along 
with the Charter, to constitute its framework.90 Despite the aspirations of 
the General Assembly, however, more recently the World Justice Project 
agreed that “there is as yet no fully coherent international legal regime gov-
erning terrorism and responses to terrorism.”91 Although counterterrorism 
law has developed in recent years, the World Justice Project is correct, and 
the high visibility of cyber threats may provide incentives to further devel-
op counterterrorism law as a set of international law norms. 
In practice, counterterrorism law has evolved as something of a hybrid 
species of law, blending parts of conventional domestic criminal laws and 
procedures with modified LOAC principles, components of human rights 
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law, and refugee and asylum law.92 By any standard, the evolution of coun-
terterrorism law has not been easy or devoid of controversy. For example, 
over the last decade, opponents of U.S. domestic counterterrorism policies 
frequently argued that some of the measures taken, such as law of war de-
tention and rendition, violated domestic law guarantees designed to protect 
criminal suspects. Our government responded that, in the ongoing coun-
terterrorism campaign, the LOAC rules applied in a “new kind of war” and 
were being followed.93 More recently, the counterterrorism targeted-killing 
policy initiated by the George W. Bush administration and expanded by 
President Obama remains controversial, in part because it reflects neither 
traditional law enforcement nor LOAC doctrines, but contains elements of 
both, and some components that are unique to counterterrorism.94 More 
particularly, in the implementation of the targeting policy, positive identifi-
cation of the target is required, although the lawful target is not a combat-
ant in LOAC terms. The LOAC principle of distinction applies, and the 
military commander in charge of the targeting operation is instructed to 
capture the terrorist suspect if that option is available, so long as the sus-
pect poses no imminent danger to the U.S. force or those around him. The 
targeting may occur wherever the target is found, but will not be carried 
out where law enforcement personnel are capable of interdicting the target 
using lawful means.95  
In a similar vein, the 2006 Israeli Supreme Court Targeted Killings deci-
sion recognizes counterterrorism law as a distinct legal paradigm, in a sort 
of back-handed way. In the Court’s opinion, instead of treating potential 
targets as either civilians or combatants according to the LOAC frame-
work, the Court said that they are citizens sometimes taking part in hostili-
ties, so that they may be targeted at only certain times.96 Although the Is-
raeli decision continues to focus on whether the government program in-
volves law enforcement or military action and thus fails to acknowledge the 
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range of counterterrorism components, the Court did recognize that the 
dichotomy between military action and criminal law enforcement is insuffi-
cient and that counterterrorism does not fit in either of those paradigms 
neatly or completely. 
The 2010 U.S. Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review 
acknowledged that counterterrorism requires a “portfolio of capabilities,”97 
including gathering intelligence about terrorist suspects through a variety of 
human and technical means, apprehending persons believed to be connect-
ed with terrorist attacks, freezing terrorist financial assets and imposing 
other financial sanctions, interdicting illicit trafficking in weapons and 
drugs that furthers terrorism, patrolling borders and transit hubs, establish-
ing regulatory best-practice standards for private-sector infrastructure, 
mounting counter-radicalization programs, and pursuing community resili-
ence initiatives. The May 2011 White House International Strategy for Cy-
berspace declared that “the United States will defend its networks . . . from 
terrorists . . . and dissuade and deter those who threaten peace and stability 
through actions in cyberspace . . . with overlapping policies that combine 
national and international network resilience with vigilance and a range of 
credible defense options.”98 
The strategy treats cyber as an operational domain, like air, sea and 
land.99 Applied to the cyber domain, counterterrorism law could support a 
variety of responses, including active defenses, other economic, intelligence 
and law enforcement operations, and kinetic responses, depending on the 
degree of harm caused by the attacks. Counterterrorism techniques in the 
cyber realm may include intelligence devices that locate and identify cyber 
terrorists and their equipment, information campaigns to counter terrorist 
propaganda, and techniques that seek to learn about and infiltrate illicit 
cyber activities and/or destroy the proliferation of cyber weapons and 
techniques. The final section takes a preliminary look at how counterterror-
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IV. AD BELLUM JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CYBER WAR—THE ROLE OF  
COUNTERTERRORISM LAW 
 
For a long time there has been a tendency among some U.S. government 
officials and legal scholars to denigrate the status of international law gen-
erally and/or to claim that international law, whatever its role elsewhere, 
should not inform law judgments made by U.S. courts or our elected lead-
ers. In the fields of national security and counterterrorism, however, 
spurred by the often eloquent and remarkably able efforts of State De-
partment legal advisers and others over several recent administrations, we 
have also learned that international law has, in fact, played a major role in 
shaping national security and counterterrorism policies and operations, and 
that international law has been respected by senior U.S. officials of both 
parties.  
Yet the “Global War on Terror” era in the years immediately after 9/11 
and the invasion of Iraq without Security Council authorization in 2003 led 
many critics to observe that the United States was going its own way legal-
ly, at the expense of international law and the harmony of international re-
lations among traditional allies. During the second term of President 
George W. Bush and throughout the Obama administration considerable 
effort has been made to articulate the international law bases for U.S. ac-
tions in pursuit of national security and counterterrorism objectives abroad, 
and the relative openness of administration lawyers about the law, includ-
ing international law, has helped restore some confidence that international 
law matters in our government’s decision-making calculus.  
At the same time that U.S. government lawyers and decision makers 
have been working to create a set of coherent and harmonious domestic 
and international legal prescriptions for high-profile security and counter-
terrorism operations abroad, such as detention and targeting,100 the incredi-
bly fast pace of evolving cyber war has quickly outstripped our capacity for 
building and implementing an integrated domestic and international law 
architecture. In other words, at a time when counterterrorism law is con-
tested and in flux and cyber threats are emerging as a central national secu-
rity concern, international lawmakers may benefit by dealing with the two 
spheres at the same time. We are playing from behind, doing our best 
working with LOAC, the Charter and operational law decisions. Fortunate-
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ly, ongoing research supported by the Department of Defense’s Minerva 
program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard on the 
development of cyber norms101 and events such as the Naval War Col-
lege/U.S. Cyber Command Conference on Cyber War and International 
Law that spurred this article can help to shore up the legal architecture for 
cyber war.  
In some cyber war settings, the still-evolving counterterrorism law 
could provide the international law corpus with new norms that account 
for the unique qualities and challenges of cyber. Reconsider defensive cyber 
operations and the attribution problem. Given the practical difficulties in 
obtaining prompt attribution of incoming cyber attacks and further assum-
ing that the speed of operations requires active defenses in the event of a 
destructive or highly disruptive cyber attack, the imminence requirement in 
self-defense may be modified to reflect the characteristics of cyber. Bor-
rowing from the lessons of countering kinetic terrorism, imminence or 
immediacy may no longer be measured only as a function of time, but in-
cludes an additional consideration—when is the last opportunity to take 
action to thwart or blunt the attacks? Cyber attacks, like kinetic terrorism, 
arrive with no warning. Surprise is the attacker’s asymmetric advantage in 
targeting the victim State. Depending on the gravity of the attack, the costs 
of waiting for the attack before responding may be unconscionably high. 
Nor is it reasonable to build into the calculus of cyber defense any expecta-
tion that cyber attackers will abide by legal requirements such as avoiding 
harm to civilians and their property.102 As such, counterterrorism law could 
complement the evolving interpretation of Article 51 self-defense by de-
veloping a nuanced and context-specific normative base for responding to 
destructive or especially disruptive cyber attacks. The Charter framework 
could remain more closely aligned with its overarching military force orien-
tation, and the new counterterrorism law could develop in ways that will be 
briefly explored in this section.   
In 2004, the Berlin Declaration on Upholding Human Rights and the 
Rule of Law in Combating Terrorism of the International Commission of 
Jurists stated that “in adopting measures aimed at suppressing acts of ter-
rorism, states must adhere strictly to the rule of law, including core princi-
ples of . . . international law. . . and, where applicable, humanitarian law. 
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These principles . . . define the boundaries of permissible and legitimate 
state action against terrorism.”103 
Despite the best efforts of some of the keenest legal minds and most 
lucid juridical and scholarly formulations, international law generally and 
LOAC in particular do not supply a clear, complete and coherent ad bellum 
framework for cyber war. The “use of force” and “armed attack” thresh-
olds were written to limit kinetic actions. Using persuasive arguments that 
the measure of invoking these gateway articles of the Charter should be 
practical, based on the effects of a cross-border intrusion and not on the 
nature of the instruments that cause the effects, Michael Schmitt and oth-
ers have shown how cyber attacks may cause harm that should count as 
uses of force and, less plausibly, armed attacks. Their view is that once the 
gateway determinations are made to reach the cyber domain, LOAC sup-
plies at least a serviceable road map for limiting cyber war.  
In activating U.S. Cyber Command in 2010, the Department of De-
fense confronted congressional skepticism and challenges from across the 
political spectrum that focused on the Command’s capabilities for interfer-
ing with the privacy rights of citizens, the policies and authorities that 
would define its mission, and its relationship to the nation’s largely private-
ly held critical infrastructure.104 While Congress and other interested con-
stituencies have continued to wrestle with the policy, scope of authorities, 
and privacy questions, from the beginning Cyber Command and the De-
partment of Defense generally have indicated that existing Charter and 
LOAC-based law adequately support the authorities of the United States to 
defend the United States from cyber attack.105 As this article has shown, 
however, there is no consensus that the Charter schema supplies a coher-
ent or adequate set of norms for regulating cyber warfare. Particularly for 
cyber attacks that are especially disruptive but not destructive—intrusions 
that may be increasingly pervasive, operating beneath the radar of existing 
defensive mechanisms, and capable of fairly easily and cheaply being perpe-
trated by virtually any State or non-State actor—the Charter provides only 
the sketchiest of normative blueprints. The recurring theme of the LOAC 
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bifurcation of international relations into states of war and peace is promi-
nently displayed in the cyber arena. If the armed attack threshold is met, 
forceful responses may be employed. Otherwise only “peaceful” defenses 
are lawful. The asymmetric opportunities for non-State adversaries abound, 
and under the Charter norms victim States may have to choose between 
defending themselves unlawfully and absorbing continuing cyber attacks.106  
Starting with the text of the Charter, this article has shown that argu-
ments to apply the “use of force” and “armed attack” Charter categories to 
cyber may be based on a tautology—if the incoming cyber intrusion is con-
strued as an armed attack, the victim State may respond in kind; if not so 
construed, the same or a similar response may not be considered an armed 
attack.107 The fact that it may be possible simply to characterize a new form 
of intrusion—cyber attack—as a use of force or armed attack is not wholly 
satisfying analytically and, over time, such tautological reasoning may di-
minish the normative values embedded in these critical cornerstones of the 
Charter. In a similar vein, State practice in shaping responses to cyber in-
trusions has been characterized as applying a “know it when you see it”108 
approach to deciding when the intrusion constitutes a “use of force” or 
“armed attack” that would trigger LOAC requirements. Such ad hoc rea-
soning does little to build confidence that the international community may 
arrive at acceptable norms for protecting critical infrastructure from cyber 
threats. 
Relying on self-defense as a legal justification for responding forcefully 
to cyber attacks would not constitute the first time that States have argued 
for Article 51 authority to respond with military force to a provocation that 
is something other than a traditional “armed attack.” At least since the 
1986 bombing of Libyan command and leadership targets in response to a 
Berlin disco bombing attributed to Libya the United States has been criti-
cized in the international community for maintaining that it has an inherent 
right to use force in self-defense against acts that do not constitute a classic 
armed attack.109 In addition, under the terms of the Charter, forceful re-
sponses against non-State actors are handicapped at the outset because the 
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Charter was drafted to regulate relations among States. Still, for under-
standable reasons, States tend to defend all their uses of force as self-
defense.110 The reliance by the United States on self-defense in its targeting 
of terrorists outside traditional battlespaces is emblematic of the tendency 
to freight legally unsettled and controversial uses of force onto the Charter 
provision, without Security Council approval or international judicial 
recognition. Of course the threats to U.S. interests have been real, if un-
conventional, and the open-textured language of Article 51 is the single 
alluring source of positive law authority that may support the expansive 
uses of force. 
However sympathetic we may be to the very real threats to national se-
curity presented by non-State terrorists wielding unconventional weapons 
unannounced against civilians, the Charter’s role in supplying the jus ad bel-
lum support for the use of force in defending against a wide range of terror-
ist attacks including cyber is open to question.111 As Sean Watts has 
warned, over time the written law of the Charter may take a backseat to the 
supposed law of self-preservation.112 At the same time, the Charter’s use of 
force/armed attack paradigm may be construed to support justifications 
for self-defense actions that do more to harm than protect peace and securi-
ty. For example, a 1999 Department of Defense Office of General Counsel 
assessment of information operations maintained that when a cyber attack 
is considered equivalent to an “armed attack,” and if it is not possible or 
appropriate to respond by attacking the specific source of the computer 
attack, “any legitimate military target could be attacked . . . as long as the 
purpose of the attack is to dissuade the enemy from further attacks or to 
degrade the enemy’s ability to undertake them.”113 Although such a re-
sponse may be lawful under LOAC, the decision to attack “any legitimate 
military target” runs the risk of escalation of a non-kinetic information op-
eration to something more lethal. 
Meanwhile, it may be that the dynamic growth of reliance on the Inter-
net to support our infrastructure and national defense has caused the Unit-
ed States to modify its long-standing views on the predicates for treating a 
cyber intrusion as an “armed attack” or “use of force.” As Matt Waxman 
has noted, U.S. government statements may be interpreted to suggest that 
only cyber attacks that have especially harmful effects will be treated as 
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armed attacks, while lower-level intrusions would enable cyber counter-
measures in self-defense.114 If the statements represent U.S. policy, the re-
sult is a tiered interpretation of Article 51 based on the instrument of at-
tack—an expansive interpretation when defending against armed violence 
and a narrower view with a high impact threshold for cyber attacks.115 
Whatever precision and calibration of authorities is gained by these fresh 
reinterpretations of the Charter, they replace the relative clarity of an 
“armed attack” criterion with fuzzier effects-based decision making that 
riles international lawyers and injects ever more subjectivity and less pre-
dictability into future self-defense projections. Given the characteristics of 
cyber war—uncertainty, secrecy and lack of attribution—finding consensus 
on international regulation through these Charter norms will be a tall or-
der.116 
As has been widely noted over the last decade or more, the Charter in 
general and LOAC in particular are not optimally situated in every respect 
to regulate conflicts between States and terrorist organizations.117 The 
State-centric orientation of the international legal instruments is based on a 
number of fundamental conceptions that do not apply easily in asymmetric 
conflicts with non-State terrorists—sovereignty and borders, declarations 
of war or armed conflict, protections for civilians and the disincentives to 
attack provided by State armies and weaponry.118 Applied to cyber war, 
similar features stand out. States and sovereign borders are not significant 
barriers to Internet-based attacks. Most cyber attackers operate anony-
mously and are unannounced. Their victims may be governments, busi-
nesses and/or citizens, and attribution problems and the mobility of the 
terrorists’ base of cyber war operations nearly eliminate the disincentives to 
attack. There are important differences between cyber attacks and other 
forms of terrorism, too. For example, most terrorist attacks produce im-
mediately observable effects of physical violence, while cyber attacks may 
cause harm that is not easily seen.  
As applied to cyber, the critique of the United States and a few other 
Western States for exporting their domestic counterterrorism policies in 
the service of a Global War on Terror may afford an opportunity for those 
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same States to have something of a “do-over” in shaping cyber defense 
doctrines. Unlike al Qaeda attacks directed at the United States and a few 
Western European allies, cyber threats are more dispersed and wide-
spread—consider the attacks on Georgia and Estonia in recent years. In 
addition to the major world powers, most States have a vested interest in 
arriving at a set of legal norms for defending against cyber attacks. Second, 
the norms that a still-maturing counterterrorism law could develop for 
cyber defense need not be threatening to the Charter or to the rule of law 
generally. The often expressed criticisms of the last decade that the United 
States was creating law-free zones in Guantanamo Bay or through its rendi-
tion practices119 should not prejudice the development of new cyber law. 
New norms could be the product of national and international strategies 
and policies, tested over time through State practice, and not simply de-
rived from existing legal doctrinal categories.120 Unlike the post-9/11 poli-
cies, new counterterrorism cyber norms would not in every instance consist 
of extensions of the domestic laws of sponsoring States. For example, the 
fact that the customary law of countermeasures does not apply to interven-
tions by non-State actors121 exposes a gap in international law that an 
emerging cyber counterterrorism law could fill. Third, because the coher-
ence of Charter- and LOAC-based international law as applied to cyber war 
really is in question, the opportunity for a scheme complementary to the 
Charter and LOAC is upon us or will soon be so. 
Most new legal fields develop in response to new social or technologi-
cal phenomena. Terrorism is anything but new. To be sure, the internation-
al networking of terrorists that led to the 9/11 attacks and others since is 
unprecedented, but domestic and international counterterrorism has occu-
pied government and lawmaking agendas for nearly half a century. The in-
ternational law of counterterrorism has been slow to develop, largely be-
cause of the politicization of the debate over definitions of what counts as 
terrorism and, as a consequence, which groups and activities may be coun-
tered with government-sanctioned programs. That the field is emerging 
internationally, despite the continuing wrangling over definitions, reflects 
the realization among States and the professionals in the field that maturing 
                                                                                                                      
119. See, e.g., Leila Sadat, Extraordinary Rendition, Torture, and Other Nightmares from the 
War on Terror, 75 GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW 1200, 1226 (2007). 
120. See Maggs, supra note 75, at 704.  













domestic counterterrorism law may be exported to the international com-
munity.122  
Attribution of cyber attacks is a technical problem, not one that the law 
can fix. Yet the challenges in attributing intrusions in real time with confi-
dence should not foreclose the development of legal authorities that can 
support responses that protect national and human security. Anonymity 
and surprise have long been central tenets of terrorist attacks, and counter-
terrorism law has developed normative principles—such as anticipatory 
self-defense—that accommodate these characteristics. By analogy counter-
terrorism law can develop along similar lines to provide ad bellum bases for 
responding to cyber attacks. In light of continuing attribution problems, 
and the likelihood that cyber attacks will come from sources around the 
world, a cyber counterterrorism law could subordinate traditional legal pro-
tections that attach to national boundaries and narrowly tailor mechanisms 
that permit defending against the sources of the attacks, whatever their lo-
cations. One of the difficulties of attribution is that learning that an attack 
comes from within a certain State does not tell us whether the attack is 
State-sponsored or was done by a non-State actor. Because existing Charter 
and LOAC law of State responsibility—heavily influenced by the United 
States and other Western States that do not have comprehensive controls 
over private infrastructure—does not make the State responsible for the 
actions of private actors over which it has no direction or control, there is 
no clear LOAC- or Charter-based authority to go after the private attackers 
inside a State when that State was not involved in the attacks.123 Counter-
terrorism law offers an alternative normative path, if criteria can be devel-
oped that tell decision makers when absolute attribution may be delayed in 
favor of immediate defensive action, when intelligence is reliable enough to 
authorize those actions and under which circumstances defensive opera-
tions may invade territorial sovereignty without State permission.124 The 
analogies to ongoing U.S. actions in its counterterrorism targeting program 
are striking.125 
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Just as counterterrorism law is developing through an uneven process 
of fits and starts, missteps and recalibrations, it is likely that international 
law governing cyber war will emerge in a similar way, over time, as the 
product of State, regional and perhaps even global policies and strategies. 
First-generation counterterrorism law developed by analogy to decades of 
armed violence in the proxy wars fought during the Cold War. Secrecy was 
the norm, attribution was unofficial or non-existent and the jus ad bellum 
architecture was unclear at best. Indeed, controversy continues to surround 
State practice in certain counterterrorism policies, such as the shadow war 
being waged by the United States against al Qaeda and its affiliates in more 
than a dozen countries outside traditional battlespaces.126 
Second-generation counterterrorism law is evolving now, a combina-
tion of exported second-generation domestic counterterrorism laws, some 
pertinent international treaties, bi- and multilateral agreements, and State 
practices that are maturing in responding to al Qaeda and other terrorist 
groups. Lessons have been learned from the proxy wars experience and 
from responding to terrorist attacks. Because terrorists’ lack of attribution 
and surprise tactics require high levels of operational secrecy in counterter-
rorism, domestic legal reforms have moved toward greater regulation of 
intelligence operations, emphasizing the providing of information on intel-
ligence operations to overseers, and an emphasis on positive identification 
of targets in potentially lethal counterterrorism operations.127  
Intelligence collection is practiced by every State. While the domestic 
laws of nearly every State forbid spying within its territory, neither those 
laws nor any international law purports to regulate espionage international-
ly. The growing capabilities for cyber sleuthing in the digital age suggest 
that development of a cyber-based intelligence law from a counterterrorism 
platform may be an important component of the architecture for twenty-
first-century cyber war governance. In the digital world, the equivalent in-
telligence collection activity is cyber exploitation—espionage by computer, 
a keystroke monitor, for example—and nothing in the Charter, LOAC or 
customary law would stand in its way, except to the extent that espionage 
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involving military weapons systems constitutes armed aggression.128 Given 
the growing capabilities of digital devices to spy, exploit and steal, including 
military and other sensitive national secrets, the absence of international 
regulation is striking and troubling. It is possible that LOAC could develop 
customarily to recognize legal limits on cyber exploitation where the soft-
ware agent is capable of destructive action or may facilitate the same.129 Yet 
intelligence collection is also at the center of counterterrorism, and likewise 
is subject to domestic legal controls, but no international legal regulation. 
As cyber exploitation assumes an ever more important role in States’ cyber 
defenses, might the international community consider developing some 
regulatory principles as part of counterterrorism law?    
In the intelligence regulation respect and others counterterrorism law 
for cyber operations may evolve through something like natural law–type 
or just war theory reasoning, as has been the case with the development of 
some other international law norms.130 Just war theory and natural law rea-
soning or its equivalent has served as a gap filler in international law, and 
could do so for cyber. Like counterterrorism law as developed and export-
ed by the United States after 9/11, the making of customary international 
law is often unilateral in the beginning, followed by a sort of dialectic of 
claims and counterclaims that eventually produce customary law that is 
practiced by States.131 Ironically, as some prominent U.S. academics devel-
oped theories of “vertical domestication”132 to encourage greater respect 
and adherence to international law by the U.S. government, in the last dec-
ade the U.S. government sought to export its emerging counterterrorism 
law as international law in response to kinetic attacks on the United States 
and its interests. Although controversy surrounded some of the U.S. gov-
ernment policies and practices, counterterrorism law has matured and de-
veloped normative content around some of its revised tenets, such as mili-
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tary detention and the use of military commissions.133 Other States may 
develop counterterrorism legal authorities in this emerging paradigm of 
cyber war through a similar process.     
However it occurs, counterterrorism law norm development for cyber 
might expand or contract the authorities that would otherwise govern un-
der current interpretations of the Charter. On the one hand, an evolving 
counterterrorism law regime may enable victim States with more tools and 
greater flexibility in anticipating and responding to cyber attacks. Active 
defense countermeasures and other kinds of responses may be permitted 
through State practice, but predicated upon counterterrorism authority, 
where the same responses would not have been lawful under the Charter as 
traditionally interpreted because the armed attack threshold was not met. 
On the other hand, some cyber responses that are now lawful under inter-
national law because there is no use of force or armed attack involved in 
the response—a small scale action designed to neutralize an incoming 
cyber intrusion aimed at one system, for example—could be considered 
unlawful if the harmful consequences are significant.134  
For the United States, the fact that so much of our infrastructure is pri-
vately owned makes securing the infrastructure legally and practically prob-
lematic,135 yet our heavy reliance on networked information technology 
makes us highly vulnerable to cyber intrusions. Our government’s recent 
posture on cyber operations has been to mark out preferred clear positions 
on the authority to respond to destructive cyber attacks with armed or 
forceful responses, while maintaining what Matt Waxman aptly calls “some 
permissive haziness”136 concerning the norms for responding to cyber in-
trusions that are less harmful but distracting. From the domestic perspec-
tive, the United States can assure itself of the authority to respond to seri-
ous intrusions, while preserving the flexibility to tailor its countermeasures 
and develop its cyber defenses according to the nature and severity of the 
threat faced.  
The nuanced calculations by the United States in developing its cyber 
doctrine is consistent with its long-standing opposition to some other 
States’ expansive interpretations of Articles 2(4) and 51 to include econom-
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ic coercion and political subversion.137 Yet emerging cyber doctrine by the 
United States may be seen in the international community as just the sort 
of proposed expansion of the Charter norms that the United States has 
publicly opposed in the past. Indeed, as the evolving criteria for what trig-
gers the Article 51 right of self-defense over the last twenty-five years 
show, freighting fast-developing cyber defense norms onto an already bur-
dened Article 51 invites controversy and may destabilize and even under-
mine the normative value of the Charter.  
Developing cyber doctrine may be more effective and more likely to be 
accepted internationally if it is separated from the effects-based approach 
relied upon by the Charter and LOAC-based doctrines for cyber opera-
tions. Relying on a developing counterterrorism law to embody the cyber 
doctrines internationally would thus serve the ancillary goal of retaining the 
traditional military force core of the bookend Charter provisions. Not that 
such a legal code of conduct based in counterterrorism law would be a 
panacea. Law must follow, not lead, particularly in an area like cyber, where 
policies are not yet well defined and strategies are unclear.138  
National policies and operational practices will lead us toward a sup-
plemental cyber law. Consider an illustration from counterterrorism law 
that developed in the carrying out of kinetic operations by the U.S. military 
in recent years when U.S. forces pursue a lawful target in a counterterror-
ism operation. As highlighted by the raid that killed Osama bin Laden in 
2011, the operational standard includes a “kill or capture” option, deferring 
to commanders on when a capture may reasonably be accomplished. Un-
der the Charter and LOAC, once a lawful target has been positively identi-
fied, the use of lethal force without further deliberation is lawful. The theo-
retically more human rights–oriented operational law, driven by counterter-
rorism policy, is becoming part of international counterterrorism law 
through State practice. In fact, operational law and military service lawyers 
have taken on a central role in military decision making and thus in the 
shaping of State practice, especially after 9/11.139 Cyber law in counterter-
rorism may develop in much the same way, based on operational rules and 
State practice that tailor the legal norms to requirements.140 
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Imagine one more scenario. This one takes place during summertime in the 
not-distant future. Just before the afternoon rush hour on a hot and steamy 
July day, the northeastern United States is hit with a massive blackout. The 
electric grid is crippled from Boston to New York, Philadelphia to Balti-
more and Washington, and from there west as far as Cleveland. While 
backup generators resume the most critical operations in hospitals and oth-
er critical care centers, all other activities that depend on electricity come to 
a sudden halt.  
Government and private industrial security experts quickly discover the 
software and malware that has accessed supervisory control and data acqui-
sition (SCADA) controls—the industrial control system that supervises 
data over dispersed components of the electric grid and which are connect-
ed to the global Internet.141 In recent years, industry reports that a few lap-
tops containing information on how to access SCADA controls were sto-
len from utility companies in the Midwest. During the same period, com-
puters seized from al Qaeda captives contained similar details about U.S. 
SCADA systems. The vast majority of the affected electric grid is privately 
owned, and officials estimate that the cyber attacks have done long-term 
damage to critical system components, and have rendered useless genera-
tors and other equipment that must be replaced where no backup replace-
ment equipment is standing by. Even rudimentary repairs will take weeks 
or months, and full system capabilities may not be restored for more than 
one year. Economic losses will be in the billions of dollars, and millions of 
Americans’ lives will be disrupted for a long time.   
The software and malware were set to trigger the blackout at a prede-
termined time. The attacks were not attributed, and although intelligence 
and law enforcement experts quickly traced the original dissemination of 
the attacks to computers in South Asia, the only other available intelligence 
comes from the seized and stolen laptops mentioned above. The govern-
ments of Russia, China and Iran have denied any involvement in the at-
tacks, and no intelligence points to their involvement. Al Qaeda has shown 
interest in cyber war capabilities, and the seized laptops suggest that some 
steps were taken to acquire them.  
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Assuming that the United States concludes that al Qaeda is most likely 
behind the attacks, what law governs the response? If, instead, we decide 
that the attacks were launched by Russian intelligence operatives situated in 
South Asia, what law governs the response? This article has helped draw 
attention to the incompleteness of the legal regime that will be required to 
provide the normative justifications for responding to these intrusions.  
The stakes are escalating. The United States used offensive cyber 
weapons with Stuxnet to target Iran’s nuclear program, and nation States 
and non-State actors are aware that cyber warfare—offensive and defen-
sive—has arrived with growing sophistication. Although reports indicated 
the United States declined to use cyber weapons to disrupt and disable the 
Qaddafi government’s air defense system in Libya at the start of the 
U.S./NATO military operation in 2011 because of the fear that such a 
cyber attack might set a precedent for other nations to carry out their own 
offensive cyber attacks,142 Stuxnet created the precedent, as did Israel’s 
cyber attack on Syrian air defenses when it attacked a suspected Syrian nu-
clear site in 2007,143 Russia’s cyber attacks in its dispute with Georgia144 and 
the apparent use of cyber weapons by the United States to target al Qaeda 
websites and terrorists’ cell phones.145 Now that the cyber war battlefield 
apparently has expanded to Beirut banks and a neutral State,146 it appears 
that cyber weapons are being used beyond countering imminent national 
security and infrastructure threats.  
Developing an international consensus on the norms for cyber war will 
be especially difficult, particularly in determining what kinds of cyber at-
tacks trigger the authority to take defensive actions and the nature of the 
defenses that will be permitted. The facts needed to make the normative 
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judgments in this fast-paced realm of changing technologies are now and 
will be for the foreseeable future hard to come by and even more difficult 
to verify.147 Law will play catch-up, as it should, but the lag between evolv-
ing technologies and normative stability in cyber operations may be a long 
one.   
This article has shown that the international community in general and 
the United States in particular run some significant risks by continuing to 
build cyber war law using the Charter/LOAC model. One overarching 
concern is that categorizing cyber attacks as a form of armed attack or use 
of force may enhance the chance that a cyber exchange could escalate to a 
military conflict.148 If, over time, the thresholds for what constitutes an 
armed attack are lowered to reach more forms of cyber attack, legal barriers 
to military force will be lowered at the same time, leading to more military 
conflicts in more places. The high threshold for invoking the Charter’s self-
defense authorities traditionally supported by the United States also offers 
some insurance against precipitous action in response to unattributed cyber 
attacks. That such a high threshold fails to deter low-level hostilities may be 
a reasonable price to pay.149 
Yet the high self-defense threshold also leaves unregulated (at least by 
the Charter and LOAC) a wide swath of cyber intrusion techniques, those 
now in existence and others yet to be invented. This by product of the bi-
furcation of international law into war and peace, armed conflict or not 
armed conflict, armed attack and use of force or not leaves every intrusion 
that fails to meet the kinetic standard not subject to international law limi-
tations, except for the limited customary authorities for countermeasures 
and the open-ended rule of necessity.150 If States or the international com-
munity attempts to further expand the reach of self-defense and LOAC in 
idiosyncratic ways to non-destructive cyber intrusions, the Charter and 
LOAC will be compromised.  
The effects-based approach to interpreting the Charter and LOAC in 
the cyber realm tends toward incoherence and lacks a normative core. 
Counterterrorism law could support or help build the normative architec-
ture for cyber operations, at least at the margins, where the legal landscape 
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is not now clear. Over time a cyber regime may develop that supplements 
the Charter and LOAC and permits forceful responses to especially de-
structive intrusions while preserving some yet-to-be-defined lower-intensity 
options for less harmful attacks. 
More particularly, despite the disconnect between the text of the Char-
ter as interpreted by the ICJ and State practice, whether an attack is kinetic 
or cyber-based, State practice has been to enable armed force in response 
to an imminent attack if it reasonably appears that a failure to act promptly 
will deprive the victim State of the opportunity to defend itself. Article 51, 
or at least its self-defense shadow, has become the go-to authority for mili-
tary action waged by States, whatever the context. The self-defense argu-
ments may be and have been adapted to cyber, but the further the analo-
gies to responses to armed attacks stray from kinetic means, the greater the 
likelihood that Article 51 norms will erode. The temptation to rely on Arti-
cle 51 is great, to be sure, particularly where, as in cyber, other sources of 
legal authority to take what is viewed as essential defensive action may not 
exist. 
The Charter- and LOAC-based cyber law that has developed in fits and 
starts over recent decades is reminiscent of the adage that if you only have 
a hammer, you see every problem as a nail. We have invested in military 
capabilities for cyber, so it has become a military use of force legal prob-
lem.151 The Charter and LOAC do not have all the answers, and cyber is 
not fundamentally a military problem.  
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